This paper nds a link between the sharp drop in U.S. manufacturing employment after 2001 and the conferral of permanent normal trade relations on China in late 2000. We nd that employment losses are larger in industries where the threat of tari hikes declined the most, and that the shift in policy is associated with suppressed job creation, exaggerated job destruction and substitution away from low-skill workers. Consistent with greater oshoring, employment losses coincide with an acceleration of U.S. imports from China and the number of U.S. importers, Chinese exporters and importer-exporter pairs.
1 Introduction 2001 as the NTR gap, dened as the dierence between the NTR applied tari rates and the non-NTR rates to which they would be raised without annual Congressional approval. Handley (2012) demonstrates theoretically and empirically that the maximum level to which a tari might be raised is an important dimension of trade policy uncertainty, and it is one that is easily captured by the NTR gap in our setting. We nd that while NTR gaps are more-or-less stable in the years leading up to China's change in status, they exhibit substantial variation across industries. Our identication strategy exploits this cross-sectional variation by using a dierence-in-dierences specication to test whether employment loss in industries with high NTR gaps (rst dierence) is larger after the 2001 peak than after previous peaks (second dierence). One attractive feature of this approach is its ability to isolate the role of the change in policy. While high-and low-gap industries are not identical, comparing outcomes within industries across peaks isolates the dierential impact of China's change in status. At the same time, comparison of employment changes across similar intervals of the business cycle allows us to control for the manufacturing sector's cyclicality.
Given the potential importance of input-output linkages, we consider three dimensions of exposure to risk reduction: the direct eect of the eliminating the NTR gap in one's own major output industry as well as two indirect eects corresponding to the removal of uncertainty in one's upstream supplier and downstream customer industries. Beginning with an analysis of employment growth at the industry level, we nd negative and statistically signicant relationships between import-tari uncertainty and relative industry employment growth up to six years after the 2001 peak. Our estimates imply that for an industry with average NTR gaps, the shift in U.S. policy reduces employment growth from 2001 to 2002 by an additional -8.7 percentage points compared with the same interval after the 1981 and 1990 peaks. Six years after the 2001 peak, the implied cumulative dierence grows to -29.6 percentage points. All three NTR gaps are inuential in these declines.
A major benet of using establishment-level data to examine employment growth at the industry level is the ability to evaluate changes along gross margins of adjustment that are intensive and extensive to establishments. We nd that PNTR is associated with both exaggerated job destruction and suppressed job creation, with the relative contribution of the latter rising in the years after 2001. These results help explain the welldocumented joblessness of the 2001 recovery in the manufacturing sector. Faberman (2012), for example, has demonstrated that this joblessness is the result of a shift down in job creation beginning in the late 1990s coupled with a sharp increase in job destruction starting in 2001. Here, we nd that PNTR coincides with both of these trends.
Analysis of employment growth at the plant level both conrms our industry ndings and provides evidence that U.S. manufacturing plants respond to greater competition from China by substituting human or physical capital for low-skilled workers. In particular, our results show that while the relationship between employment growth and the own-industry NTR gap is negative and statistically signicant for production workers, it is positive and statistically signicant for non-production workers. To the extent that the latter embody higher levels of skill, this substitution is consistent with trade-induced technical change and product-mix upgrading.
Finally, we use rm-level U.S. import data to examine the relationship between PNTR and U.S. trade with China. As these data are unavailable until the mid-1990s, we amend our dierence-in-dierences specication to evaluate outcomes across trading partners in the years before and after 2001 rather than across business cycles. These comparisons reveal a positive and statistically signicant relationship between the shift in U.S. trade policy and the relative growth of U.S. imports from China in terms of import value, the number of U.S. importers, the number of foreign exporters, and the number of importer-exporter pairs. Consistent with the existence of a relationship between PNTR and oshoring, these relationships demonstrate that U.S. imports surge in precisely the set of goods where domestic employment loss is concentrated, and with the exact trading partner that is the subject of the shift in U.S. trade policy.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines our contribution to existing research, Section 3 describes our data, Section 4 provides a brief discussion of the models used to guide our empirical analysis, Sections 5 through 7 present our results, and Section 8 concludes with suggestions for further research.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to a large body of research spanning international trade, labor and macroeconomics that explores a link between globalization and domestic employment. In the international trade literature, a number of studies have found a negative relationship between import competition and manufacturing employment, especially when that competition is from low-wage countries in general, and China in particular. 2 The macroeconomics literature, by contrast, has generally not found a major role for international trade in patterns of job creation and destruction over the business cycle, or in the jobless recoveries to recessions observed in the past two decades.
We make contributions to several strands of these literatures. First, we show that a substantial portion of the loss of U.S. manufacturing employment during and after the 2001 recession is related to a discrete and easily identiable change in policy the U.S. conferral of PNTR on China. While others, including most recently Autor, Dorn and Hansen (2012), have highlighted a negative relationship between U.S. employment and Chinese imports, our research points to a specic cause for the acceleration of Chinese imports starting in 2001, and relates it to a wide range of outcomes across U.S. and Chinese producers. 3 In particular, we show that the largest relative declines in employment 2 Early work in this area, by Freeman and Katz (1991) and Revenga (1992) , documents a negative relationship between growth in U.S. manufacturing employment and either imports or changes in import prices at the industry level. Subsequent research focuses on the impact of imports from low-wage countries across industries (e.g., Sachs and Shatz 1994) and establishments within industries (Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2006 in the years after 2001 are concentrated in industries characterized by high NTR gaps, and that these industries experience the largest surges in Chinese import value as well as the number of U.S. importers and Chinese exporters.
Second, our examination of rms' reactions to import-tari uncertainty contributes to the broad literature analyzing investment under uncertainty as well as its recent application to international trade. 4 Our eort in this regard is most closely related to the work of Handley (2012) and Handley and Limao (2012) , who show that if uncertainty regarding either the timing or the magnitude of tari changes in a destination market falls, the productivity threshold for entry into exporting to that market falls, as relatively low-productivity rms lose their incentive to wait and see how taris will change before absorbing the sunk costs associated with entry. Our contribution to this literature is to demonstrate the strong and wide-ranging eects of perhaps the most signicant change in import-tari uncertainty since the turn of the century the granting of PNTR to China.
Third, we provide evidence of a link between international trade and the joblessness of the 2001 recovery in manufacturing. Several papers, including Baily and Lawrence (2004) and Mankiw and Swagal (2006) argue that international trade plays a small role in this phenomenon. Here, our use of highly disaggregated data and our focus on a specic policy yields strong evidence that trade is directly and indirectly associated with the large and long-lasting decline in U.S. manufacturing employment in the years after 2001. Moreover, our nding that PNTR has a more profound eect on production workers than nonproduction workers relates to recent research by Jaimovich and Siu (2012), which shows that the increasing joblessness of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing recoveries in recent decades is driven by the disproportionate loss of jobs that perform routine tasks.
Finally, our consideration of own-, upstream-and downstream-industry NTR gaps contributes to a growing literature related to supply-chain co-location. Baldwin and Venables (2012), for example, consider dierent forms of supply chains that emerge in response to the forces that encourage (e.g., transport costs) or discourage (e.g., factors costs) co-location. A key implication of the model they develop is that oshoring may jump discretely if a change in trade costs triggers a relatively large portion of a supply chain to move abroad. Relatedly, Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2010) show that proximity to input suppliers and nal customers is the most important factor in the agglomeration patterns of U.S. manufacturing industries. Here, we use the own NTR gap to identify employment loss associated with potential increased competition from China in one's own industry. The upstream and downstream NTR gaps, by contrast, help identify employment loss due to greater potential Chinese competition in the industries of establishments' major suppliers and customers. 4 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide an overview of this real options literature. its NAICS children would be grouped into the same family. If one of those NAICS codes later concords with an updated NAICS code, whose family history includes a broader set of SIC, those subsequent NAICS and SIC codes also join the original family. Given this process, it is easy to see that some families can grow to be quite large. For this reason, we have created several concordances that limit the inclusion of children that do not account for some threshold level of the parent's activity. (Industry-to-industry concordances generally specify both the identity of a parent's children as well as the share of activity usually output or employment which they inherit.) These limits create a tradeo. Higher thresholds generate a larger number of families with more closely related underlying SIC and NAICS codes. Lower thresholds lead to a smaller number of families, most of which are likely to include both manufacturing and non-manufacturing codes. As a result, lower thresholds create spawn constant manufacturing sample results in a much smaller share of raw manufacturing employment than higher thresholds.
10 Series CEU3000000001, available at www.bls.gov. As the BLS series is NAICS-based, manufacturing employment prior to 1997 excludes SIC industries that do not map into NAICS manufacturing industries.
As noted above, our sample is SIC-NAICS-based, meaning that we also drop NAICS industries not classied as manufacturing under the SIC. For further detail on construction of the BLS series, see Morisi (2003 14 We measure the potential tari increase faced by U.S. importers of a Chinese good prior to PNTR as the gap between these rates, where a higher gap indicates a greater potential increase. Figure 3 For each NAICS industry n we compute the average NTR gap across the eight-digit HS tari lines with which it is associated using concordances provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 15 We then compute an upstream and downstream NTR gap for each NAICS industry n using information provided in the use table of the BEA's 1997 input-output matrix, which reports the value of all industries g that are used to produce industry n. 16 The upstream NTR gap for industry n is the weighted average NTR gap across the industries g that supply n, using the use values (v) as weights,
where,
To compute the downstream NTR gap, we follow the same procedure after reversing the g and n indexes in the use table. 17 As the input-output matrix includes many services that are not traded, and therefore are assumed to have an NTR gap of zero, the weighted averages taken in equation 1 are lower than the own-industry NTR gap.
We use eight-digit HS NTR and non-NTR rates from 1999, the year before the policy change, to create the own-, upstream-and downstream-industry NTR gaps used throughout the paper. This choice has little substantive impact, as we obtain ndings very similar to those reported below using NTR gaps from any of the years available to us, 1989 to 2001. 
17
The use values in the input-output matrix are assigned according to BEA input-output categories.
As a result, we split the use value evenly among all NAICS industries to which a BEA input-output category maps.
labor-intensive industries such as apparel, textiles and furniture, and lower for capitalintensive industries such as food and petroleum. As noted in the introduction, one benet of our dierence-in-dierences specication is its ability help control for such variation: even though high-gap industries are not identical to low-gap industries, our approach controls for any time-invariant dierences between industries. At the same time, comparison of industries across similar stages of the business cycle allows us to account for the cyclicality of U.S. manufacturing employment. 19 Given the proximity of the 1980 and 1981 recessions, as well as the greater severity of the latter, we ignore the 1980 peak and focus on employment loss following the 1981, 1990 and 2001 peaks.
As illustrated in Figure 4 , the 1981 recession stands out in terms of declining economic activity, measured either in terms of aggregate GDP or the Industrial Production Index 19 These data are available at www.nber.org/cycles.html. We note that these peaks do not necessarily correspond to the manufacturing employment peaks of these business cycles. We ignore the 2007 recession as the the LBD is available only until 2009, and the last CM available is 2007. than half that amount during the 1990 and 2001 recessions. Loss of manufacturing employment, by contrast, is far more severe following the 2001 recession than the 1981 and 1990 recessions.
While this loss is dramatic, it is important to note that it is not accompanied by a decline in value added. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure shoring. Though many models of importing, like the one just described, focus on producers who import inputs directly from foreign suppliers, one can imagine the emergence of intermediaries (e.g., wholesalers) that match foreign goods to purely domestic producers.
Bernard et al. (2010), for example, report that wholesalers and retailers account for more than half of U.S. imports from China in 2002. In the model of exporting developed by Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei (2010) , rms that are not suciently productive to overcome the costs associated with nding their own foreign customers export via an intermediary.
In our setting, the shift in U.S. trade policy might promote the expansion and entry of agents that facilitate indirect importing. By further driving down the relative demand for domestically produced but higher-priced substitutes, these agents may encourage local producers to shrink, exit or decide not to enter.
Finally, a reduction in import-tari uncertainty may encourage rms to invest in the development of either labor-saving technologies (other than direct or indirect oshoring), or product mixes that compete less directly with imports from China. Acemoglu (2002), for example, develops a model in which trade liberalization can aect the skill bias of technical change.
PNTR and Industry Employment
In this section we show that employment losses are larger in industries where the threat of tari hikes declined the most. Examining employment loss by intensive and extensive margins of adjustment, we also nd that the shift in U.S. policy is associated with both suppressed job creation and exaggerated job destruction.
5.1

Industry Employment Growth d Years After Each Peak
We investigate the relationship between PNTR and industry-level cumulative employment growth using an OLS dierence-in-dierences specication that identies dierential growth in high NTR gap industries (rst dierence) d years after 2001 compared to analogous periods after the 1981 and 1990 peaks (second dierence). We estimate the following equation using data from the LBD and CM:
The dependent variable is the cumulative percent change in industry i's employment relative to its peak t level. To examine how the eect of PNTR evolves over time, we estimate this equation separately for intervals from d = 1 to d = 6 years after each peak. The rst three variables on the right-hand-side of the specication are the three dierence-in-dierence (DID) terms: interactions of an indicator variable for the 2001 peak and the own, upstream and downstream NTR gaps for industry i, which vary by manufacturing establishments in California. industry but not by t or d. These three NTR gaps are indexed by o. X it is a vector of industry characteristics in peak year t. For regressions using the LBD, X it contains only the log level of peak-year t employment, ln(Emp t i ). Regressions based on the CM include a larger set of controls and are estimated across decades that span each peak. δ id and δ td are industry and peak-year xed eects, which control for time-invariant dierences between industries and common macro-level shocks. These xed eects are indexed by d, i.e., that they are specic to a particular interval after each peak.
The rst six columns of Table 2 report results using the LBD. We nd that almost all estimates of α do are negative and statistically signicant at the ten percent level (noted with bold-faced type), and that their absolute magnitudes generally rise with d, indicating that the association between employment growth and PNTR is persistent. We assess the economic signicance of the coecients in the last block of rows of the table by multiplying the estimate for each DID term by the average NTR gaps for manufacturing as a whole reported in the nal row of Table 1 . The implied eects are substantial: the cumulative employment growth of an industry with the average NTR gaps is -8.7
percentage points (-0.052*0.34-0.450*0.11-0.189*.11) lower one year after the 2001 peak compared to previous downturns. This implied eect rises in absolute magnitude to -29.6
percentage points (-0.334*0.34-1.362*0.11-0.334*.11) six years after the peak.
The nal four rows of of Table 2 reveal that all three NTR gaps contribute signicantly to the implied impact of PNTR, implying that an industry's employment may fall substantially even if it is only indirectly exposed to trade liberalization via its upstream The negative and statistically signicant coecient with respect to the upstream NTR gap is particularly interesting as, in theory, the elimination of import-tari uncertainty on upstream industries can have two countervailing eects on own-industry employment. As noted in Section 4, if reduction in upstream uncertainty results in greater availability of lower-cost inputs, own-industry costs and therefore prices might decline, boosting demand and the need for workers. 23 On the other hand, if eliminating upstream uncertainty pushes upstream production oshore, customers of that production may nd it optimal to move to the same oshore location in order minimize transportation or other costs that depend on geographic proximity. The strong association between employment growth and the upstream NTR gap exhibited in our results suggests that the second channel dominates.
The nal column of Table 2 reports results based on the CM, which are estimated 22 To the extent that an establishment contains several sections of a supply chain, the upstream and downstream NTR gaps may identify exposure to risk reduction that is more direct than indirect. 
Industry Employment Growth by Margins of Adjustment
We use the longitudinal identiers in the LBD to decompose industry job loss into six mutually exclusive and comprehensive gross margins of adjustment that are extensive and intensive to establishments. We examine one intensive and two extensive margins. 25 Surviving plants whose ownership is transferred between surviving rms are included in the intensive margin. Excluding these plants from the intensive margin has no material impact on our results. We note that while this margin is intensive with respect to the establishment, it may be extensive with respect to production units with a plant, such as production lines. Unfortunately, the change from SIC to NAICS discussed in Section 3 prevents us from investigating product-mix changes across business cycles within continuing plants. 26 Growth by gross and net margin of adjustment is presented in tabular form in Table A.3 of the   electronic appendix. PBD and FBD, respectively. Here, the behavior of the intensive and rm birth-death extensive margins stand out. In particular, initial declines in the net intensive margin disappear four or ve years after the 1981 and 1990 peaks. That is not the case after the 2001 peak, where the declines are both more substantial and more persistent.
We assess the impact of China's receipt of PNTR status on gross margins of employment adjustment by estimating equation 3 separately for each margin m and interval d. The dependent variable in each of these regressions is the cumulative change in employment in industry i and margin m from t to d as a percent of initial industry (not industry-margin) employment,
As a result, changes across margins sum to the dependent variable in equation 3, i.e., m ∆Emp t:t+d im /Emp t i = ∆Emp t:t+d i /Emp t i . Table 3 reports results for d = 6. Given the normalization in equation 4, the sum of the DID coecients for the six gross margins, in the rst six columns of the table, sum to the DID coecient for overall employment, estimated in the previous section and repeated in the nal column of Table 3 for comparison. As above, estimates are in bold if they are statistically signicant at the ten percent level, and the nal block of rows summarizes economic signicance.
Coecient estimates for the DID terms in Table 3 are negative for all of the gross mar- DID estimates for all time periods and margins are reported in Table A .4 of the electronic appendix. We summarize their economic signicance in Table 4 Table 2 reports a strong relationship between job loss and a reduction in import-tari uncertainty in rms' downstream industries, potentially driven by the disappearance of one's domestic customers. In addition, the strong contribution of rm death in Table A .4 suggests that rms competing head-to-head with China may simply exit rather than move production oshore. Table 4 reveal that the contributions of the three NTR gaps to gross job creation and destruction vary. We nd that the own-industry NTR gap contributes relatively more to the implied impact of PNTR via suppressed job creation than exaggerated job destruction. For d = 6, for example, it accounts for 45 percent (- We multiply the estimated DID coecients for each gross margin and time interval in electronic appendix Table A .4 by the corresponding NTR gaps for each industry to compute the margin-industry-interval dierential cumulative growth rate associated with the shift in U.S. policy. We then add the employment implied by these growth rates back to the actual employment for each margin, industry and interval. Summing over industries yields counterfactual employment by margin for the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
Panels C and D of
PNTR and Plant Outcomes
In this section we examine the eect of PNTR on manufacturing plants using data from the CM. These data allow us to examine a broad range of outcomes and to use a rich set of establishment characteristics as controls. We begin by estimating a plant-level variant of equation 3:
The dependent variable is the log dierence in establishment e's employment across CM decades, i.e., t ∈ {1977, 1987, 1997}. The three DID terms capture the own, upstream or downstream NTR gaps of the establishment's major industry i. X et is a matrix of plant characteristics in year t that includes employment, capital and skill intensity, plant age and plant total factor productivity (TFP). 28 We include plant xed eects, δ e , to 28 We measure TFP with an index number approach in which output is measured as the logarithm of deated revenue and inputscost of materials, production employment, non-production employment and book value of capitalare weighted by the average cost share for each input, at the industry level.
While we deate revenue with industry-level price deators from Bartelsman, Becker and Gray (2005) control for unobserved plant characteristics that are time invariant and, as above, include peak-year t xed eects to mitigate the impact of cyclicality. Our use of a log dierence as the dependent variable restricts our examination to the intensive margin. Table 5 reports results for total employment growth as well as growth in non-production employment, production employment and production hours. As above, the nal block of rows in the table computes economic signicance, in this case by multiplying the DID estimates by the respective averages for manufacturing as a whole (from the nal row of Table 1 ), exponentiating, and subtracting 1.
Three trends stand out. First, we nd that the implied impact of PNTR on 1997
to 2007 employment growth is almost four times stronger for production workers (-17.0 percentage points) than non-production workers (-4.6 percentage points). Second, results for production hours are very similar to those for production workers, suggesting no substantial change in hours worked per employee. Finally, the relationship between the own-industry NTR gap and the dierential growth of non-production workers is positive and statistically signicant. This implies that non-production worker growth for a continuing plant with the average own-industry NTR gap is 8.3 percentage points higher from 1997 to 2007 than in the previous two decades.
To the extent that non-production workers embody higher levels of human capital than production workers, this outcome suggests a relative increase in continuing plants' The nal four columns of Table 6 examine the relationship between the shift in U.S.
trade policy and the relative growth of continuing plants' labor productivity. Coecient to obtain our measure of output, we note that this approach does not control for within-industry price dierences and the level of observed productivity can be aected by changes in plant-level prices. For a detailed discussion of the properties of this TFP measure, as well as the limitations of revenue-based forms of productivity, see Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) .
estimates imply that PNTR is associated with declines in real shipments and real value added that are about two times stronger than the decline in employment, i.e., -30.6 and -32.1 percentage points versus the -13.2 percentage points reported in the rst column of Table 6 . As a result, continuing plants possessing the average NTR gaps are predicted to experience labor productivity growth that is -18.1 and -19.6 percentage points lower between 1997 and 2007 than was experienced by these plants in the prior two decades.
Given the trend in aggregate labor productivity growth implicit in Figure 5 , these results imply that most of the growth in labor productivity experienced in the years after 2001 is due to continuing plants with relatively low-exposure to reductions in importtari uncertainty as well as reallocation towards higher labor-productivity entrants along the extensive margin. Price declines associated with indirect importing is one potential channel for these gains.
PNTR and Trade Flows
In 
We analyze the 1997 to 2007 interval to mimic the CM decades examined above, but note that we nd similar relationships across narrower windows that begin in 2001.
30
∆Z As product-country trade data exhibit an abundance of zeros, we use the normal- 
which is bounded by 2 and -2 and equals those values for observations that start or end at zero, respectively. For the same reason, we dene ln(Z h ) to be the denominator of the right-hand side term in equation 7 rather than the initial level.
Results for import value, the number of U.S. rms that import from China, the number of Chinese rms that export to the United States, and the number of importerexporter pairs are reported in Table 7 . We nd a positive and statistically signicant relationship between the NTR gap and all of these dimensions of U.S. importing. Our estimates imply that a product with the average NTR gap (0.32) exhibits growth in import value from China between 1997 and 2007 that is 19.6 normalized percentage points higher than the growth in import value across all other U.S. trading partners over this period. The dierential growth for the numbers of U.S. importers, Chinese exporters and importer-exporter pairs is 32.2, 39.5 and 34.7 normalized percentage points, respectively.
These large relative increases in U.S. imports from China as well as export and import participation by Chinese and U.S. rms are impressive given that PNTR had no eect on the tari rates actually applied to Chinese imports. They are also in remarkable accord with the predictions of Handley's (2012) model of trade policy uncertainty, and an application of the insights of that framework to models of oshoring. Indeed, U.S. imports surge in precisely the set of goods where domestic employment loss is concentrated, and with the exact trading partner that is the subject of the shift in U.S. trade policy.
Conclusion
This paper examines the sharp decline in U.S. manufacturing employment that occurs after 2001. We show that this decline coincides with a major shift in U.S. trade policy the conferring of permanent normal trade relations status on China that aected expectations about how import taris on Chinese goods might change rather than the actual levels of these taris.
Our results provide evidence in favor of the two dominant explanations for the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment that have appeared in the literature. Consistent with models of oshoring, we show that the largest declines in employment and increases in imports were found in the industries that experienced the greatest reductions in tari uncertainty. At the same time, in accord with models of skill-biased technical change and product-mix upgrading, we show that reductions in import tari uncertainty are associated with increases in continuing plants' skill and capital deepening.
Our results also raise a number of questions worthy of further study, including the precise mechanism by which labor productivity grew in the years after 2001, the eect of PNTR on skilled-and unskilled workers' wages, and the aect of the shift in U.S. policy on the nature of U.S. manufacturing. We hope to contribute answers to all of these questions in the near future. 
By Gross Margin
Manufacturing Employment Loss Across Recessions 
By Net Margin
Manufacturing Employment Loss Across Recessions A Revealed Taris on Chinese Imports
We compute the revealed tari on Chinese imports as the ratio between duties collected and dutiable value across all ten-digit HS manufacturing products imported from China using the trade data in Feenstra, Romalis and and extended by Schott China's U.S. import penetration is its import share multiplied by the standard expression for import penetration,
where M it , X it and Shipments it represent total imports, exports and domestic shipments for manufacturing industry i in year t, respectively. We compute P EN China it using industry-level domestic shipment data from the publicly available NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database assembled by Becker and Gray (2009) and HS-level import and export data from Feenstra, Romalis and and . We map the HS-level trade data to either SIC or NAICS industries using the concordances of Pierce and Schott (2012). 
